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Abstract 
The Internet has engendered serious cybersecurity problems due to its anonymity, transnationality, 
and technical shortcomings. This paper addresses state-led cyberattacks (SLCAs) as a particular 
source of threats. Recently, the concept of the Bright Internet was proposed as a means of shifting 
the cybersecurity paradigm from self-defensive protection to the preventive identification of 
malevolent origins through adopting five cohesive principles. To design a preventive solution 
against SLCAs, we distinguish the nature of SLCAs from that of private-led cyberattacks (PLCAs). 
We then analyze what can and cannot be prevented according to the principles of the Bright 
Internet. For this research, we collected seven typical SLCA cases and selected three illustrative 
PLCA cases with eleven factors. Our analysis demonstrated that Bright Internet principles alone 
are insufficient for preventing threats from the cyberterror of noncompliant countries. Thus, we 
propose a complementary measure referred to here as the Internet Peace Principles, which define 
that the Internet should be used only for peaceful purposes in accordance with international laws 
and norms. We derive these principles using an approach that combines the extension of physical 
conventions to cyberspace, the expansion of international cybersecurity conventions to global 
member countries, and analogical international norms. Based on this framework, we adopt the 
Charter of the United Nations, the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
Recommendations by the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts, the Tallinn Manual, and 
Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and others as reference norms that we use to 
derive the consistent international order embodied by the Internet Peace Principles. 
Keywords: Bright Internet, Cyberattack, State-Led Cyberattack, Preventive Cybersecurity, 
Internet Peace Principles 
1 Introduction 
Information Cyberattacks present serious threats to 
national infrastructure and defense systems as well as 
to the private sector. Cyberattacks can be defined as 
“actions taken through the use of computer networks 
to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information 
resident in computers and computer networks, or the 
computers and networks themselves” (Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2009, p. 111). Such threats not only have 
private-led origins, but also state-led origins.  
In this paper, we propose a framework that can 
prevent state-led cyberattacks (SLCAs), which state 
agencies themselves and/or employed individuals or 
companies conceive of and operationalize. SLCAs are 
capable of attacking not only military and 
governmental systems but also critical civilian 
infrastructure, such as financial systems, 
telecommunication systems, energy systems, 
transportation systems, and private corporations. In 
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contrast, private-led cyberattacks (PLCAs) may also 
threaten governmental systems, as well as private 
companies, homes, individuals, and civilian 
communities, but do so mainly to gain illegal 
economic advantages through ransomware, phishing 
and/or stolen credit cards. By private actors we mean 
nonstate actors, including individuals, ordinary 
citizens, script kiddies, hackers, “hacktivists” (such as 
Anonymous), “patriot hackers” (a student-run 
cybersecurity group formerly known as the Electric 
and Computer Hacking Organization), cyberinsiders, 
cyberterrorists, malware authors, cyberscammers, 
organized cybercriminals, and corporations (Sigholm, 
2013).  
To characterize the nature of SLCAs, we collected 
seven typical SLCA cases and contrasted them with 
three illustrative PLCA cases. To compare and 
contrast their differences and commonalities, we 
organized the cases according to the following eleven 
perspectives: attack purposes, targets of attacks, 
origin country, attack means and methods, attack 
routes, timing, duration, preparation period, 
investigation period, consequences, and applicable 
laws. We found that the specific actors, purposes, 
targets, attack timing, means, methods, and 
circumstantial evidence pertaining to SLCAs differ 
significantly from those of PLCAs despite the fact 
that the basic technologies for both are nearly 
identical. Because attacking countries do not admit 
their responsibility, origin traceability technology 
alone cannot identify the origins of SLCAs. Thus, an 
analysis of other evidence, such as repeated 
introductions of malware from a particular country 
and/or circumstantial evidence, should be considered 
as well. 
Assuming that the sources of anonymous cyberattacks 
from global origins are uncontrollable, current 
cybersecurity systems primarily attempt to defend 
their own systems reactively. To overcome such a 
limitation, the concept of the Bright Internet was 
recently proposed as a framework for preventive 
security that makes the origins of malicious 
cyberattacks transparent, traceable, and identifiable. 
In the current paper, we adopt the Bright Internet 
framework for preventing SLCAs by adopting its five 
principles: origin responsibility, deliverer 
responsibility, identifiable anonymity, global 
collaboration, and privacy protection (Lee et al., 2018, 
Lee, 2015). 
By adopting the Bright Internet framework, the 
premise is that transparency can deter the generation 
of SLCAs from member countries who conform to 
the principles of the Bright Internet. Among member 
countries, participating governments will monitor for 
the malicious emission of cyberattacks within their 
own countries according to established responsibility 
chains which can be inherited from the international 
law on the Responsibility of States (2001). However, 
the origins of SLCAs may not be fully identifiable if 
cyberterror countries do not honestly report the 
malicious origins, especially when plotting SLCAs.  
Moreover, not all states may agree to become 
members of the Bright Internet. Therefore, it is 
necessary to add a complementary measure, which we 
term the Internet Peace Principles, which prohibits 
the use of the Internet as a weapon for attacking other 
countries or as a means of detoured malicious attacks. 
By combining the five principles of the Bright 
Internet with the Internet Peace Principles, we aim to 
design a framework of preventive security that can 
deter SLCAs. 
To derive the concept and practice of the Internet 
Peace Principles, we adopt a combination of the 
following three approaches: the extension of physical 
conventions to cyberspace, the expansion of 
international cybersecurity conventions to global 
member countries, and analogical international norms. 
We adopt the Charter of the United Nations (UN 
Charter), draft articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Responsibility of 
States), the Geneva Convention IV (Geneva 
Convention), and the Hague Convention IV (Hague 
Convention) in order to extend the traditional 
convention to cyberspace. We adopt the UN Group of 
Governmental Experts (UN GGE), the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to 
Cyber Operations1 (the Tallinn Manual) through an 
invitation by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Center of Excellence, and the Council of Europe 
Convention of Cybercrime (CECC) for the expansion 
of international cybersecurity conventions to global 
member countries. In addition, for the derivation of 
similar principles from analogous international norms, 
we adopt the Outer Space Treaty and the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 
From these existing conventions and the Bright 
Internet principles, we derive the Internet Peace 
Principles which can contribute to the prevention of 
SLCAs. 
The remaining sections of this study are organized as 
follows. In Section 2, we review two categories of 
literature related to this paper: security and privacy 
research in information systems literature and 
referential international conventions. In Section 3, we 
review the principles of the Bright Internet to explain 
how they can deter cyberattacks through the 
transparent traceability and identifiability of attacking 
origins while protecting the freedom of expression and 
privacy of innocent netizens. We review five principles 
                                                          
1 The Tallinn Manual 2.0, published in 2017 contains the Tallinn 
Manual 1.0 that did not address legal problems of cybersecurity 
outside armed conflicts published in Fleck (2013). 
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of the Bright Internet in relation to the characteristics 
of SLCAs. In Section 4, we analyze seven SLCA and 
three PLCA cases along eleven perspectives to 
determine the differences and commonalities between 
them. Section 5 reviews the benefits of the Bright 
Internet principles for Bright Internet Global 
Organization (BIGO) member countries. However, we 
also recognize their limitations if cyberterror countries 
are not signatories to the BIGO Agreement. In order to 
develop a complementary measure, we use current 
conventions to derive the Internet Peace Principles in 
Section 6. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the 
future research agenda. 
2 Literature Review 
We review two categories of literature. 
2.1 Security Research in the Information 
Systems Literature 
Lee et al. (2018) reviewed the literature on 
information systems security research with two-
dimensional perspectives toward both the target entity 
(e.g., individual, organization, society) and research 
methodology (e.g., behavioral science and design 
science). According to this review, most security 
research in information systems journals has dealt 
with behavioral studies of individuals and 
organizations.  
Anderson and Agarwal (2010), Wang et al. (2015), 
Chen and Zahedi (2016), Johnston and Warkentin 
(2010), and Steinbart et al. (2016) conducted 
individual behavioral research on the topics of 
behavioral security, protection motivation, and 
information security threats. Herath and Rao (2009a, 
2009b), Bulgurcu et al. (2010), D’Arcy et al. (2009), 
Willison and Warkentin (2013), Mitra and 
Ransbotham (2015) and Hsu et al. (2015) conducted 
organizational behavioral research on the topics of 
intraorganizational information security 
policy/technology and human-related issues.  
Oetzel and Spiekermann (2014) reviewed the 
multidisciplinary nature of privacy research, and 
Belanger and Crossler (2011) conclude that most 
privacy research in the information systems domain 
concentrates on individual-level issues. Therefore, 
Belanger and Crossler (2011) and Pavlou (2011) 
stress the need for research on design and action at 
the societal level. 
In contrast to the existing literature in information 
systems journals, research on preventive security 
against SLCAs is unusual, and this paper is likely the 
first attempt. From the perspective of behavioral 
research, the Bright Internet needs experimental 
studies at the societal level concerning netizens’ 
behavior in order to justify social norms pertaining to 
the Bright Internet and the Internet Peace Principles. 
The research subjects could be individuals, 
organizations, and/or countries; security behavioral 
research would certainly be expanded by this type of 
research. Various empirical studies could emerge 
following the actual deployment of the Bright Internet 
system and ensuing test bed. 
However, during the early stages of Bright Internet 
research, more attention should be paid to the design 
science aspect of the global information system 
infrastructure in terms of technologies, policies, and 
international collaborations. Lee et al. (2018) 
proposed the design science perspective of Bright 
Internet development, and the frameworks of Gill and 
Hevner (2013), Hevner et al. (2004), and March and 
Smith (1995) are useful for validation purposes. 
2.2 Referential International Conventions 
There exists no established global convention for 
peace in cyberspace similar to our Internet Peace 
Principles. The extant conventions were established 
long ago for a physical-space context and have not 
been effectively applied to cyberspace. The scope of 
current research on the cyberconvention is 
fragmented and often only regionally applicable. As 
such, a comprehensive set of principles is needed that 
is consistent with current social norms and that 
considers the characteristics of the Internet. Whereas 
Lee et al. (2018) adopted prevention motivation 
theory and analogical social norms to justify five 
Bright Internet principles, the Internet Peace 
Principles adopt three approaches, as discussed above. 
We review the current conventions below. 
For the extension of the traditional conventions on 
cyberspace, we reviewed the UN Charter (1945), the 
Responsibility of States (2001), the Geneva 
Convention IV (1949), and the Hague Convention IV 
(1907).    
The UN Charter article 1 in chapter I (“Purposes and 
Principles”) states that the purpose of the United 
Nations is “to maintain international peace and 
security,” which is also a key foundational element of 
the Internet Peace Principles. Article 1 also states the 
aim “to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threat to the peace and for 
the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace.” Article 51 in chapter VII 
(“Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, 
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”) 
refers to the practice of self-defense and 
countermeasures: “UN Security Council may take . . . 
demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by 
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United 
Nations” according to article 42 in chapter VII. These 
provisions should be extended to the Internet peace 
and cyberattack contexts.  
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The Responsibility of States defines that “every 
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the 
international responsibility of that State” (article 1). It 
also specifies that wrongful acts include wrongful 
actions and omissions of duty (article 2), and defines 
the person or entities of government authority (article 
5) which can be extended to include software that is 
programmed by governmental persons. Articles 21 
and 22 specify the conditions to justify self-defense 
and countermeasures, and articles 34-37 define the 
types of reparations of injuries and damage as 
restitution, compensation and satisfaction. These 
articles could easily be extended to the Internet 
context.  
The Geneva Convention IV preamble and articles 
prohibit attacking civilian and civilian objects, and 
the Hague Convention IV regulates the unlimited 
use of means and methods of warfare, both of which 
could be extended to the cyberattack context.  
For the expansion of international cybersecurity 
conventions, representative cases selected here are the 
United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN 
GGE), the Tallinn Manual, and the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime (CECC; 2001). Their 
initiatives must be expanded to global members to 
make them effective among all Internet user countries.  
The UN GGE consists of twenty countries and is 
based on geographical distribution; it includes 
cyberpower countries such as the USA, China, Russia, 
France, the UK, and Germany. The member countries 
of this convention have met since 2004 and created 
reports recommending norms and principles. 
According to the 2015 UN GGE report, the 
recommendation includes the following limiting 
norms: States “should not knowingly allow their 
territory to be used for internationally wrongful act 
using ICTs” and “should not conduct or knowingly 
support ICT activity that intentionally damages or 
otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical 
infrastructure” (United Nations, 2015, p. 2). This 
refers to the prohibition of SLCA acts. The 
recommendation also prevents the proliferation of 
malicious ICT; this supports the Bright Internet 
principles of origin responsibility and deliverer 
responsibility. The UN GGE also recommends the 
positive duties of cooperation by exchanging 
information and prosecuting terrorists and the 
criminal use of ICT (Park & Chung, 2016), which can 
be seen as the basis of the global collaboration 
principle for the Bright Internet.  
The Tallinn Manual is the only document that 
specifies the international laws applicable to 
cyberwarfare and cyberoperations. The manual 
provides rules about state actors’ responsibilities as 
well as their jurisdictions and countermeasures during 
cyberconflicts. The manual was produced by the 
independent International Group of Experts as a 
nonbinding document. The NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Center of Excellence produced the Tallinn 
Manual 1.0 in 2013, and updated it in 2017 as the 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 which identified the international 
laws applicable to cyberwarfare and cyberoperations 
in 154 rules (Schmitt, 2017).  
The manual (2017) stipulates various regulations 
reflecting the characteristics of cyberspace, including 
diplomatic and consular law (rules 45-54), 
international telecommunication law (rules 61-64), 
the law of the sea (rules 45-54), the air law (rules 55-
57), and the space law (rules 58-60). It specifies 
sovereignty (rules 1-5), and states’ due diligence 
(rules 6-7), and jurisdiction (rules 8-13). In this regard, 
the manual mentions states’ responsibility and 
internationally wrongful acts. Rules 20-26 prescribe 
the cyberattacked state’s entitlements to seek 
countermeasures. In particular, it details the offending 
state’s responsibility concerning assurance, 
guarantees, and reparation (rules 27-29). The manual 
elaborates cyberoperations not regulated by 
international law, such as peacetime cyberespionage 
(rules 32-33). In addition, it extends the current 
international regulations to cyberspace, including the 
principle of nonintervention (rules 66-67) and 
peaceful resolution of conflicts (rule 65). The manual 
describes the prohibition of the use of force as a 
critical issue (rules 68-70) and explains when and 
how this principle is applied. Moreover, in the same 
context, it specifies when cyberactivities constitute an 
armed attack (rule 71) and hostility (rules 86-130) and 
therefore how and when cyberattacked states should 
conduct self-defense (rules 71-75) which is a 
cyberextension of the Geneva Convention. It also 
includes the prohibition of attacking civilians and 
their facilities (rules 94-102) and the use of cyber 
means and methods that cause unnecessary injury or 
suffering (rules 103-105) during hostilities. It 
prohibits attacking places of worship and nuclear 
electric power generating stations (rule 109). It also 
notes the use of ICT for the enforcement of naval and 
aerial blockades, and discusses the validity of 
cyberblockades (rule 128). However, it explicitly 
prohibits collective punishment by cybermeans (rule 
144), unlike the UN Charter which seeks collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats. 
These stipulations need further study because 
collective cyberblockades may occasionally be 
necessary to prevent cyberattacks from cyberterror 
countries.  
The CECC is an international agreement founded in 
2001 for the purpose of addressing Internet and 
computer-network crime through establishing 
common criminal policies, procedures, and methods 
among member countries. The CECC refers to the 
need to pursue a common criminal policy to protect 
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society against cybercrime. It recognizes “the need 
for cooperation between states and private industries 
in combating cybercrime” (CECC, 2001, p. 2) and 
holds that effective measures against cybercrime 
require strong, timely and well-functioning 
international cooperation in criminal matters. 
However, the CECC does not cover issues associated 
with SLCAs. 
To derive analogical international norms, we selected 
two relevant treaties: the Outer Space Treaty and the 
NPT under the auspices of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). The Outer Space Treaty was 
adopted in 1967, with the signers agreeing that the 
benefits of space exploration should be bestowed on 
all of humankind (Porras, 2006). The treaty 
recognizes that outer space shall be the province of all 
humankind—cyberspace is also virtually borderless 
and should thus adopt the same spirit.  
In the NPT (1968) and the vision of U.S. President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace,” we find 
support for prohibiting the proliferation of 
fundamental threats to cybersecurity, such as the 
cases demonstrated in Section 4, through adopting the 
Bright Internet and Internet Peace Principles. 
Likewise, the proliferation of the malicious 
production and distribution of cybermalware should 
also be prohibited. It is noteworthy that the IAEA was 
established as a body researching nuclear safety, 
security, and verification as well as the development 
of peaceful uses of nuclear power. Similarly, we need 
a global agent, like the BIGO, that is devoted to 
research on and the deployment of the Bright Internet 
in cooperation with existing international 
organizations, as described in Section 6. 
3 The Principles of the Bright 
Internet 
The principles of the Bright Internet proposed by Lee 
in 2015 were more recently updated by Lee et al. 
(2018). This section reviews how the principles of the 
Bright Internet are designed to identify the origins of 
cyberattacks while ensuring the freedom of 
expression and protection of privacy for innocent 
netizens. To attain these goals, we adopt five 
principles, depicted in Figure 1 below: the principles 
of origin responsibility, deliverer responsibility, 
identifiable anonymity, global collaboration, and 
privacy protection. Lee et al. (2018) argued for the 
need for these principles based on the perspectives of 
prevention motivation and analogical social norms. 
Below, we review the definitions of these principles 
and discuss their applicability to SLCAs. 
 
Figure 1. Bright Internet and Internet Peace Principles 
  
Preventing State-Led Cyberattacks 
157 
 
The principle of origin responsibility states that the 
“offensive originators of malicious codes and illegal 
hacking should be responsible for the consequence of 
their malicious behaviors” (Lee et al., 2018, p. 71). 
This is basically identical to the principle of state 
responsibility. To realize this principle, computer 
users should not only be concerned about protecting 
their own systems but should also take care not to 
attack others from their computers. Layers of origin 
responsibility refer to the individual users, servers, 
companies, and countries associated with the 
cyberattacks. However, with regard to illegitimate 
SLCAs, the responsible country may hide the 
individuals and servers who commit attacks; hence, 
responsibility for this type of unidentified origin 
should be borne by the country in which it emerges. 
In addition, the attacking government may utilize 
computing resources outside of their own country, as 
demonstrated in Section 4. This is why the principle 
of deliverer responsibility is essential to offset the 
loophole of origin responsibility. 
The principle of deliverer responsibility means that 
“compromised computers or Internet service 
providers who are involved in the delivery process of 
cyberattacks, even unintentionally, should cooperate 
to prevent the delivery of identifiable harms to users 
at the destination” (Lee et al., 2018, p. 72). To realize 
this principle, computer users should avoid attacking 
others as zombie computers. For instance, when a 
malicious DDoS attack is made on U.S. domain name 
servers, U.S. citizens and internet service providers 
should seek to avoid acting as zombies for the enemy. 
Through the effort of participative prevention, global 
netizens can protect each other and maintain peace in 
their countries. 
If attackers abuse the resources of third countries to 
stage detoured cyberattacks, the citizens of such a 
country should take preventative measures to avoid 
being compromised and unwittingly participating in 
attacks on friendly countries. This should be the 
ethical and legal standard for global safety of the 
Internet around the world. Both PLCAs and SLCAs 
should be prevented by imposing this principle on 
those countries who agree with it. A country that does 
not agree with this type of mutual protection should 
be regarded as a potential cyberterror country and 
treated differently. This is why a collective measure is 
necessary. 
Even when it is possible to identify the origin IP 
address, malicious attackers will use pseudonyms to 
hide their actual names. This is why the principle of 
identifiable anonymity is necessary, which means 
that “The real name or equivalent identity of the 
criminal origin should be identifiable in nearly real 
time in the context of a valid search warrant, while 
the voluntary anonymity of innocent netizens should 
be preserved” (Lee et al., 2018, p. 73). There are a 
number of approaches that can be used to implement 
the principle of identifiable anonymity, but 
cyberterror countries that commit SLCAs will not be 
interested in abiding by this principle. This is why the 
Internet Peace Principles need a sanction mechanism, 
as described in Section 6. 
The principle of global collaboration is necessary 
for collaboration in the identification of real names 
across borders. This principle states that “in order to 
implement the principles of the Bright Internet on a 
global scale across borders, it is essential that Internet 
user countries collaborate globally in terms of 
communication, cooperation, execution, and reporting” 
(Lee et al., 2018, p. 74). Through a collaborative 
search, the real names of malicious attackers outside 
borders can be identified. However, cyberterror 
countries will not take part in such a collaborative 
effort. It is important to recall that the need for 
international cooperation between states is stressed by 
the CECC. 
Overall, the above preventive security principles 
should not infringe on the privacy of innocent 
netizens. Thus, the principle of privacy protection is 
also necessary. It states, “The Bright Internet system 
should be technically and legally designed in 
consideration of protecting privacy, which may be 
threatened by adopting security-related principles” 
(Lee et al., 2018, p. 74). Assuring the auditing 
capacity for uncovering the footprints of illegal 
access of private information both technically and 
legally will mitigate privacy infringements. This 
principle may be agreed upon by the member 
countries of the Bright Internet, but cyberterror 
countries will not conform to it. Therefore, again, the 
Internet Peace Principles and an enforcing measure 
are necessary to avoid the loophole inherent within 
the Bright Internet principles alone. 
4 Characteristics of State-led 
Cyberattacks 
To analyze the characteristics of SLCAs in contrast to 
PLCAs, we present seven SLCA cases and three 
PLCA cases, as summarized in Tables 1 and 2 (in the 
Appendix), respectively. We collected the data for 
these cases from various open sources, such as study 
results from research institutions, governmental 
investigation results, annual reports, white papers, 
and the testimony of North Korean defectors. 2  We 
collected SLCA cases from validated sources, such as 
the FBI (2014); Zetter (2011); Tikk et al. (2010); the 
Supreme Prosecutors’ Office (2015); the Korean 
                                                          
2 Kim Heung-Kwang revealed North Korea’s Cyber Unit’ Reality, 
2015-01-26, Retrieved from 
http://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly_program/rfa_interview/rfainterv
iew-01262015095622.html 
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Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning (2013); 
and the Korean National Police Agency (2009), as 
listed in Row 12 of Table 1. To complete the data for 
the eleven factors, we investigated many additional 
sources, as given for each quoted data point in Table 
1. We collected PLCA cases from Stefanek (2016), 
the Korean National Police Agency (2011), and 
Charette (2012), as listed in Row 12 of Table 2, and 
we also referenced the sources of supplementary data 
for each quoted data point in Table 2. We use 
asterisks to mark primary references, and identify 
other supplementary sources with the letters (a), (b) 
and (c). Table 3 in the Appendix also shows the 
attack routes, and the references are provided in the 
far-right column.  
To characterize the cases, we compared eleven factors. 
These included the purposes of the attacks, the targets 
of the attacks, the origin country, the attack means 
and methods, the attack routes, and the timing, 
duration, preparation period, investigation period, 
consequences, and applicable laws. Collecting many 
SLCAs is very difficult because confirming the 
identities of attackers is not often possible given that 
the suspected countries typically do not admit that 
they harbored the attackers. It is also difficult to 
access the proper data sets to gain the full spectrum of 
the eleven factors listed above. For instance, we could 
not include recent cyberattack cases, such as Russia’s 
interference in the U.S. presidential election and the 
DDoS attack against domain name servers in 2016, 
because we could not collect the entire spectrum of 
data. However, in the cases we used, there was 
sufficient nontechnical evidence that could pinpoint 
the originating countries. 
Through this process, we selected seven typical cases 
from twenty major cyberattacks (see footnote) 3  as 
presented below. 
S1)  Attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014, 
which destroyed and leaked information as the 
first SLCA that targeted a particular private 
corporation.  
S2)  Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear facility in 2010. 
                                                          
3 There are a number of major SLCAs not included in the study 
from 2003 to 2016, such as (1) the 2016 Russian interference in the 
U.S. presidential election, (2) the 2015 Australian supercomputer 
hack, (3) the 2014 full-fledged battlefield of cyber warfare between 
Russia and Ukraine, (4) the 2013 6/26 DDoS attack on South 
Korea’s government agencies, (5) the 2013 anonymous attack on 
Singapore in response to web-censorship regulations, (6) the 2012 
Saudi Arabia Aramco attacks with the virus “Sharmoon,” (7) the 
2012 attacks on Iran with the computer malware Flame, (8) the 
2011 Jasmine Revolution, (9) the 2010 cyberattacks on Myanmar 
related to the 2010 general election in Myanmar, (10) the 2010 
Indian-Pakistan cyber conflict, (11) the 2008 cyberattacks on U.S. 
military computers, (12) the 2002-2005 Titan Rain attack to collect 
defense-related information in the U.S. and (13) the 2003 1/25 
Slammer attack. 
S3)  DDoS attack against Georgia along with a 
traditional military campaign in 2008. 
S4)  DDoS attack against Estonia in 2007, which was 
the first national-level cyberattack.  
S5)  Hacking against the Korea Hydro & Nuclear 
Power Co., Ltd. (KHNP) in South Korea in 2014. 
S6)  3/20 Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attack 
that caused major economic damage (US$867.2 
million) to South Korea in 2013. 
S7)  7/7 consecutive cyberattacks against the USA 
and South Korea in 2009. 
Collecting PLCA cases is also difficult because 
companies that experience damage tend to hide this 
fact to avoid giving the impression that their IT 
resources are vulnerable. For comparison, we selected 
three typical types of PLCAs out of the many 
cyberattacks that occurred during the last fifteen years.  
P1)  The ransomware attack against Hollywood 
Hospital in 2016, which encrypted patient data 
using ransomware and demanded money to 
decrypt the data. 
P2)  The hacking and advanced persistent threat attack 
against SK Communications in Korea in 2011, in 
which information of about 35 million customers 
was stolen.  
P3)  The information-leakage attack against Coca-
Cola in 2009, which stole negotiation 
information between Coca-Cola and the China 
Juice Company.  
Based on these cases, we compare the commonalities 
and differences between the SLCAs and the PLCAs 
for each factor. Despite some commonalities in the 
basic technologies between the two types, SLCAs 
differ fundamentally in terms of the types of attacks, 
the actors, the purposes, the targets, the levels of the 
techniques used, the attack timing, the language, and 
the specific malware used. Therefore, it is necessary 
to establish appropriate preventive measures and 
countermeasures against SLCAs. 
4.1 Purposes of Cyberattacks 
States may use cyberattacks as a diplomatic tool with 
political purposes or as a national warning against 
potential enemies by causing social chaos and 
economic damage, threatening national defense and 
critical functions, and obtaining information about 
military and critical national infrastructure. This is a 
preferred option because it can be done without 
serious criticism from the international community 
and without fatal retaliation. As an example, in Case 
S1, North Korea warned the USA, the United Nations, 
and their allies not to play the film “The Interview” 
before they attacked Sony in 2014. 
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SLCAs also exploit the vulnerability of an enemy as 
an instrument for weak states or even private actors in 
order to inflict serious damage on more powerful 
states with greater traditional military power (Roscini, 
2010). In Case S7 of the 7/7 DDoS attack, North 
Korea attacked 14 U.S. government agencies and 22 
Korean government agencies (Clarke & Knake, 2010). 
SLCAs may occasionally be operationalized by 
nongovernmental organizations (Kozlowski, 2014). 
On the other hand, the primary purpose of PLCAs is 
to gain ransom money, leak personal information, 
gain the upper hand in competition, show off skills, 
gain private benefits, and promote the attacker’s 
personal and/or religious interests. PLCAs 
increasingly use ransomware to extort money in 
return for a solution to the encrypted data, as in the 
Hollywood Hospital Case P1 and the recent 
WannaCry attack. 
4.2 Targets of Cyberattacks 
The countries most frequently attacked by SLCAs are 
South Korea and the USA, along with others such as 
Iran, Georgia, and Estonia. The primary attack targets 
in these countries are critical infrastructure, such as 
energy systems, government organizations, financial 
institutions, and broadcasters. Attackers also target 
defense agencies and weapon systems, the general 
public, and private corporations, as demonstrated 
below. 
4.2.1 Energy Systems 
Typical targets in energy systems are nuclear power 
plants and electricity transmission systems, as in Case 
S5, in which a nuclear power plant in South Korea 
was attacked in 2014. An extension of nuclear power 
plants is nuclear weapons, which may be directly 
related to military systems. An example of deterring 
the development of a nuclear weapon was Case S2, 
i.e., the Stuxnet attack against an Iranian nuclear 
facility in 2010. 
4.2.2 Governmental Organizations 
In Case S4, there was “a series of massive 
coordinated cyberattacks on the Estonian public and 
private sectors” in 2007 (Rehman, 2013). These 
included the national assembly, governmental 
organizations, newspapers, broadcasters, and banks. 
Case S7, the 7/7 DDoS attack was conducted in July 
of 2009 (Digital Times, 2010) against 14 U.S. 
government organizations and 22 South Korean 
governmental organizations, including the 
presidential office, the Ministry of National Defense, 
and the National Assembly in Korea. 
4.2.3 Financial Institutions and Broadcasters 
All financial services and payments are closely 
interconnected by the Internet and dedicated networks. 
Thus, financial institutions are the Achilles heel of 
society. The attack of Case S3 occurred against 
Georgia in June of 2008. This DDoS attack aimed to 
disable banks, educational facilities, government 
organizations, businesses, Western press companies, 
and Georgian hackers’ websites (Kozlowski, 2014). 
The DDoS attack paralyzed the banking system and 
ATM services and deprived the government of 
control over its social systems (Tikk et al., 2010). 
Case S6 involving the 3/20 APT attack was 
conducted in March of 2013 against three banks 
(Shinhan, Nonghyup & Jeju Banks) and three major 
broadcasters (KBS, MBC, & YTN) in South Korea 
(Jang, 2013). 
4.2.4 A Particular Corporation 
A SLCA against a particular corporation occurred 
when Sony produced the movie “The Interview.” The 
hackers attacked Sony to damage the entire set of 
interior data and to leak unreleased movies. 
4.2.5 General Public 
SLCAs may target the general public on popular 
websites such as internet service providers (ISPs), 
portal sites, e-mail sites and the websites of public 
institutions. Such computer resources may be 
maliciously compromised. For instance, popular sites 
in South Korea, such as Naver, Daum, auction.co.kr, 
nalsee.com, conservative associations’ homepages, 
and computer vaccine companies’ homepages, were 
targeted by attackers, who compromised them as 
zombie websites during the 7/7 DDoS attack.  
In contrast, PLCAs aim to attack enterprises, 
individual companies, government institutions, and 
hospitals. The targets are similar to those of SLCAs 
although the purposes may differ. 
4.3 Origin Country 
To trace the origin of SLCAs, we need to identify the 
origin IP address and its country. However, in the 
current Internet environment, attackers can easily 
spoof the locations of origins by compromising other 
computers and detouring though virtual private 
networks (VPNs) via third countries. According to 
Table 3, the attacks on the nuclear power plant in 
Case S5 had four originating locations in three 
countries: North Korea, Beijing and Shenyang in 
China, and Russia.  
The attack on Sony Pictures in the USA originated 
from Chinese IPs, although they were exclusively 
used by North Korea. The man-in-the-middle attacks 
in Case S2 of the Iran Stuxnet attack required that the 
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attackers physically access the target. The cyberattack 
against the Iran nuclear facility, known as the 
“Olympic Game” (Sanger, 2012) attack, was 
operationalized in 2010, and the USA and Israel were 
suspected of being behind the attack (Kushner, 2013) 
although both governments deny involvement in the 
operation. 
Nevertheless, five cases have used IPs in the 
attacker’s own country, possibly because it is not easy 
to secretly locate an entire attacking troop in a foreign 
country. Even Case S5 included an IP address of its 
originating country. 
• In Case S3 involving the cyberattacks against 
Georgia, the attack was conducted during the 
Russian engagement in the Georgian attack on 
South Ossetia, which has a pro-Russian 
government. The attack was carried out by 
patriotic hacktivists and attackers who used 
Russian government IPs, but the Russian 
government denied any connection to this attack.  
• In Case S4, the Estonian government found that 
Russian computers were involved in the attack, 
but the Russian government denied any 
involvement (Ruus, 2008). In the beginning, 
amateur hacktivists started the attack, but during 
the final stage, specialists joined in the attack 
(Ruus, 2008). 
• In Case S5 involving the hacking of a nuclear 
power plant in South Korea, the attack was 
carried out by attackers with North Korean IPs 
who used the malicious code that was used 
during other North Korean cyberattacks against 
South Korea.  
• In Case S6 of the 3/20 APT attack, a North 
Korean agency (the Reconnaissance General 
Bureau) with North Korean IPs exploited a 
South Korean vaccine update program in a patch 
management system (Digital Times, 2010).  
• Case S7 involving the 7/7 DDoS attack 
originated in North Korea. 
According to these seven cases, the most frequent 
origins of cyberattacks are North Korea and Russia, 
and only a few countries, such as the USA, Russia, 
China, Iran, and North Korea are known to have the 
capability to conduct SLCAs (Clarke & Knake, 2010). 
Therefore, tracing the attacker’s origin IP address is 
very important to identify the responsible country, 
although they may spoof the IP address on the current 
IPv4 platform. This is why the importance of 
implementing an unchangeable origin IP address 
protocol is stressed, possibly on the IPv6 platform, in 
the design of the Bright Internet. 
On the other hand, PLCAs are conducted by private 
actors; accordingly, the origin IPs can be any country, 
although the three PLCAs cases in Table 3 either 
originated in China or were unidentified. It is 
essential for ransomware attackers such as those in 
Case P1 to conceal their origins and use Bitcoin. In 
this regard, the anonymous cryptocurrency has the 
capacity to facilitate criminal activities. 
4.4 Attack Means and Methods 
There are four main attack means and methods4 used 
for cyberattacks: hacking, the spreading of malicious 
code, distributed denial of service (DDoS), and 
combined attacks (Kang et al., 2010). According to 
2017 Cost of Cyber Crime Study (Ponemon Institute, 
2017), the percentages of cyberattacks in the four 
categories experienced by companies in 2017 are as 
follows: 
(a) Hacking: web-based attacks (67%)     
(b) DDoS: DoS (53%), botnets (63%)  
(c) Spreading of malicious: malware (98%), 
malicious code (58%), ransomware (27%); 
(d) Combined attacks: phishing and social 
engineering (69%), malicious insiders (40%), 
and stolen devices (43%).  
According to the seven SLCA cases in Table 1, the 
following attack methods are used: 
(a) Hacking attacks including APT attacks, 
homepage defacements, web server attacks and 
zero-day attacks: Relevant cases are S1, S2, S3, 
S4, S5, S6, and S7 in Table 1 and P1, P2 and P3 
in Table 2. 
(b) DDoS: Cases S3, S4, and S7.  
(c) Spreading of malware: Cases S1, S2, S5, S6, 
and S7 and P1, P2 and P3. 
(d) Combined attacks: Cases S5 and P3. 
According to the case analysis, we observe that 
SLCAs and PLCAs use different attack means and 
methods. SLCAs use more sophisticated and proven 
technologies than PLCAs. For example, 
cyberweapons such as Stuxnet are developed in secret 
over a long period of time with better financial 
support (Chang, 2012, p. 6) and are carried out as 
combined attacks. The same unique malware, such as 
Kimsuky, was used repeatedly during SLCAs by the 
same country. Typical means and methods of SLCAs 
are new, combined, and advanced technologies, such 
as zero-day exploitations of new computer 
                                                          
4  Methods are cybertactics, techniques, and 
procedures, and means refer to cyberweapons and 
their associated cybersystems according to the Tallinn 
Manual of 2017. 
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vulnerabilities, as analyzed in Table 1. The APT 
attack was a typical tailored attack against a specific 
target involving long-term preparation by employing 
a combination of methods, such as social engineering, 
zero-day attacks, rootkits, and sometimes DDoS 
attacks as well. For the compromise and spreading of 
malicious code, advanced account hijacking and 
worms such as Kimsuky, Wiper, Dark Seoul and 
MyDoom were used in the cases involving South 
Korea, and Destover was used in the U.S. attacks. In 
contrast, PLCAs mainly use ransomware, phishing, 
keyloggers, and malware for swindling purposes and 
to obtain information. 
4.5 Attack Routes 
SLCAs route through many ISPs and VPNs in both 
origin and destination countries. As described in 
Table 3, all SLCAs and P2 exploited multiple routes 
from origins to destinations using direct and indirect 
courses through a third country, mostly through China 
or the USA, but also through Japan, Thailand, and the 
Netherlands. Thus, implementing the deliverer 
responsibility principle and global collaboration on 
the Bright Internet is very important in order to 
prevent detoured attacks. SLCAs detoured through 
many more countries to conceal the attackers’ identity 
than did PLCAs, as shown in Tables 1 and 2.  
4.6 Attack Timing  
Cyberattacks can be conducted at any time and from 
anywhere. However, SLCAs are usually initiated 
when important national issues arise and when 
sending a warning message is deemed necessary. 
North Korea conducted a cyberattack as a warning 
message to the USA on Independence Day. 
Cyberattacks may be operationalized as a weapon 
immediately before and during a traditional war, as in 
Case S3. Hacktivists may attack another group when 
a social conflict occurs within a country or between 
countries. On the other hand, criminal PLCAs are 
conducted at a time of interest for the private attacker. 
4.7 Attack Duration 
The attack duration of SLCAs is usually a few 
months, while PLCAs tend to take only a few days. 
However, the duration depends upon the incident. 
SLCA cases in this study lasted on average 74 days 
per attack, while PLCA cases lasted only 13 days on 
average, because SLCAs tend to be more complicated, 
staged, and large-scale attacks. For instance, the 
hacking of the nuclear power plant in Case S5 
continued for four months. However, the average 
duration of PLCA cases chosen for this study appears 
to be longer than typical, judging from the statistics in 
the consequences section.  
4.8 Preparation Period 
SLCAs usually require longer preparation than 
PLCAs because SLCAs tend to be more elaborate and 
large-scale events than PLCAs. SLCAs usually take 
at least a few months or even a few years depending 
upon the time of need and time necessary to develop 
and penetrate the target system. The well-timed 
attacks against Sony Pictures right before the release 
of the movie shortened the preparation time to three 
months, while the Stuxnet attack against Iran took 
many years to prepare.  
4.9 Investigation Period 
According to the cases in Tables 1 and 2, an 
investigation of a SLCA took 57 days on average 
from the occurrence of the incident to its first 
announcement of the result based on the analysis of 
S1, S5, S6, and S7. On the other hand, PLCAs had 
shorter periods than SLCAs due to their relatively 
small scale and limited scope. 
4.10 Consequences 
SLCAs usually damaged the target by destroying PCs, 
main boot records, hard disks, and data. It is neither 
easy to investigate the consequences of SLCA 
incidents nor easy to calculate the damage caused. 
SLCAs typically cause major economic damage (e.g., 
US$867.2 million in the 3/20 APT attack in Case S6) 
and social disorder, while also threatening national 
security. The average amount of damage in four cases 
of S1, S4, S6, and S7 in Table 1 was US$260 million 
per attack. According to the Ponemon Institute (2015), 
cyberattacks in general caused average damages of 
US$78,000 per attack. 5   Thus, we find that the 
damage caused by SLCAs (US$260 millions in Table 
1) is about 3,000 times greater than that caused by 
PLCAs.  
4.11 Applicable Laws 
Wrongful conduct by SLCAs can be regarded as 
national illegal activity, violations of international 
duty, and infringements on other countries’ national 
interests. Currently, the Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty may be used as a platform to support 
international collaboration, but it is not entirely 
effective. Hence, when SLCAs cause physical 
damage and destruction, the conduct should be 
governed by the spirit of the UN Charter, the 
                                                          
5 According to a survey of 252 companies in seven countries, each 
company encountered an average of 1.9 cyberattacks per week, 
costing an average of US$77,935 per attack, and US$7.7 million 
per year. The highest annual average was US$15.42 million in the 
U.S., while the lowest was US$2.37 million in Russia (Ponemon 
Institute, 2015).  
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Responsibility of States, the Geneva Convention and 
the Hague Convention. However, these conventions 
have not yet been extended to cyberspace. In 
particular, when SLCAs result in the breaching of an 
international obligation according to the UN Charter 
and the Tallinn Manual, the attacked country can 
invoke legitimate countermeasures. If incidents 
involve the use of force, they should be reviewed by 
the United Nations Security Council. In contrast, 
PLCAs can be appropriately regulated according to 
the national criminal laws of each country.   
5 Application of the Bright Internet 
against State-Led Cyberattacks 
In this section, we elaborate on the characteristics of 
SLCAs vis-à-vis PLCAs from the perspective of the 
Bright Internet principles, as depicted in Figure 2. For 
this purpose, we call the global governance body that 
would enforce the Bright Internet principles the 
Bright Internet Global Organization (BIGO). We 
review how SLCAs that originate in BIGO member 
countries could be transparently identified and thus 
prevented, whereas those from BIGO nonmember 
countries (non-BIGO countries) would not be 
preventable. Concerning the PLCAs from non-BIGO 
countries, it is uncertain whether these countries 
would cooperate to identify private origins. This is 
why the complementary measure of the Internet 
Peace Principles is necessary, as we discuss in 
Section 6.  
To deploy the five principles of the Bright Internet, 
all countries who use the Internet should accept the 
principles and install the appropriate systems 
necessary to implement the principles with due 
diligence. However, the adoption of the Bright 
Internet does not mean that the current Internet will 
be replaced entirely. The Bright Internet may be 
selectively adopted for essential applications. We 
now turn to an analysis of SLCAs in the context of 
Bright Internet principles. 
  
Figure 2. Origins and Targets of Cybersecurity Threats 
5.1 Origin Responsibility  
In our case analysis, we determined that the traced 
origin IP address is the major form of evidence used 
to identify responsible countries. Note that most 
attacking countries use their own resources within 
their own countries, although they sometimes also 
detour the origin of certain attacks. However, no 
country under suspicion would likely agree with the 
claims of a country under attack. Therefore, it is clear 
that the origin IP address alone is not sufficient to 
determine legal responsibility in the context of 
international legal systems. Accordingly, we must 
consider other supplementary factors to identify the 
originator of SLCAs, such as attack methods, attack 
timing, and circumstantial evidence, such as the 
purpose and consequences of the attack, as described 
below. 
Origin IP Address as Evidence: The origin IP 
address tends to be located within the attacker’s own 
country. To ensure the traceability of origin IP 
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addresses, it will be useful to adopt the IPv6 protocol6  
(Nygren, 2015), since this platform can support 
antispoofing (Geers, 2011).  
Attack Means and Methods as Evidence: Some 
SLCAs may use the same means and methods 
regardless of the location of the originating country. 
For instance, the attacks of Case S5 that originated in 
China used the same malware “Kimsuky” that was 
used by North Korean hackers. Special language 
characters and the repeated use of similar malware 
can serve as evidence of the origin country. However, 
there is a small risk that attackers may maliciously 
use the malware of another attacker to disguise the 
origin.  
Attack Timing as Evidence: The attack timing and 
consequences are closely interrelated in most cases. 
Therefore, the attack timing can serve as supportive 
evidence, but is not definitive. In Case 5, the attacks 
from North Korea and China occurred at the same 
time. 
Circumstantial Evidence: The surmised purpose and 
its consequences can serve as circumstantial evidence. 
These factors include the prevailing political 
environment, the top leader’s expressed intention to 
retaliate, the nature of the target, and whether the 
operation portends the future use of military force 
(Schmitt, 2017).  
As shown above, a combination of the origin IP 
address, the attack methods, timing, and 
circumstantial evidence are useful for the 
identification of origins, although they cannot be 
taken as absolute evidence. One reason that countries 
currently use cyberattacks to attack their enemies is to 
avoid serious legal repercussions. Therefore, it will be 
necessary to increase the number of BIGO member 
countries abiding with the Internet Peace Principles. 
5.2 Deliverer Responsibility  
5.2.1 Detoured Attacks: Using ISPs 
If an attacker sends malware through VPNs, The 
onion router (TOR) networks, or proxy servers, 
platform managers such as ISPs should be able to 
detect suspicious packets. BIGO countries could help 
each other prevent detoured attacks through their own 
countries. However, some states may not legally 
allow surveillance of their ISPs. CECC member 
countries, China, Russia and others allow such 
surveillance. However, the USA and South Korea do 
not allow this type of surveillance in order to protect 
the privacy of Internet users. However, the 
                                                          
6 As of June 24, 2017, 37.3% of Internet users in Belgium adopted 
IPv6, 24.8% in the U.S., 12.0% in Japan, 2.0% in South Korea, and 
0.8% in China (Akamai, 2017). 
governments of these countries recently passed bills 
allowing surveillance in order to prevent terrorism.7 It 
has become a global trend for most governments to 
require ISPs to assume deliverer responsibility for 
national security. 
5.2.2 Wide Range of Victims: Using Zombie 
PCs 
Compromised (zombie) computers in detoured 
countries themselves may not have even recognized 
that they were compromised, but they can be 
manipulated by malicious state-led hackers, as shown 
in Cases S3, S4, and S7. Therefore, detection and 
prevention technologies for routers and PCs must 
necessarily be developed so that they can avoid 
becoming compromised. Deliverer responsibility will 
be also a channel for identifying the original attacker 
behind zombie PCs. Through the international 
collaboration of deliverer responsibility, cyberattacks 
outside of an attacker’s country could be detected by 
associated BIGO member countries. However, 
detoured cyberattacks through nonmember countries 
would remain undetectable. Therefore, it is essential 
that every country becomes a BIGO member and 
exercises jurisdiction over its own cyberpersonnel, 
equipment and facilities in order to avoid being 
targeted as a detoured cyberterror haven. 
5.3 Identifiable Anonymity 
Under current Internet protocol, the identification of 
the real names of anonymous hackers is not possible 
because the origin servers are not required to have the 
capacity to identify real names. A case study 
demonstrated that hostile countries use their own IPs, 
but they refused to cooperate in identifying the 
responsible originators. Accordingly, the 
investigation of real originators would not be possible 
for non-BIGO countries. 
To allow for the freedom of anonymous expression 
for innocent netizens, the Bright Internet adopts the 
principle of identifiable anonymity. This principle can 
be implemented by adopting two layers of names: real 
names and optional pseudo-names (Lee et al., 2018). 
This principle could be implemented by encouraging 
a voluntary real-name IP account in order to gain the 
benefit of trustworthiness, as is done in the credit card 
industry. In case users need a space for anonymous 
expression, they could gain an additional application-
level account, such as a social network or portal site, 
which would limit other types of computation that 
could be abused for hacking. Thus, within a BIGO 
member country, the real names of cyberattackers 
could be identified if a valid search warrant were 
                                                          
7 South Korea: Anti-Terrorism Act of 2016; U.S.: Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act of 2015. 
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issued, but again this would not be possible with non-
BIGO countries. 
5.4 Global Collaboration 
A timely investigation of a SLCA requires prompt 
and effective international investigative cooperation. 
Nevertheless, cooperation with hostile countries will 
not be easy for both technical and political reasons. 
Computer investigations require sophisticated 
investigational skills and processes as well as the 
preservation of evidence on computers and in related 
facilities. In Case S4, Russia refused a joint 
investigation proposed by Estonia in 2007, and North 
Korea has consistently denied any involvement in 
cyberattacks against South Korea. The different legal 
systems in different countries can also delay such 
investigations. In the Philippines, the virus “I Love 
You” was spread globally via e-mail in 2000, causing 
US$8.7 billion of damage, but the culprit could not be 
indicted because there was no applicable Philippine 
law in place (Deflem & Shutt, 2006).  
Under the BIGO Agreement, the real names of 
cyberattackers could be identified among BIGO 
member countries even across borders if an 
internationally valid search warrant were issued, but 
again this would not be possible in non-BIGO 
countries. A standard global legal and technical 
framework for collaborative searches is essential to 
protect against detoured cyberattacks from third 
countries. However, the prevention of attacks from 
non-BIGO countries would require another deterrence 
measure. 
5.5 Privacy Protection 
The privacy of innocent netizens on the Bright 
Internet will be maintained by distinguishing innocent 
netizens from malevolent criminals and terrorists. 
Real names will be required only when a valid 
authority detects criminal evidence. To protect the 
privacy of innocent citizens, transparent audits by a 
trusted third party could be adopted. Privacy 
assurance technologies that log the footprints of 
illegal access to prohibited private data would also be 
necessary (Agre & Rotenberg, 1998). Emerging 
blockchain technology may be adopted to implement 
this principle. When a real name is stored for the 
implementation of identifiable anonymity, an 
adequate encryption method could be used so that 
private information would not be leaked and this 
information would not be released without a valid 
search warrant. These issues will require substantial 
research to fulfill privacy aims while maintaining 
operational efficiency. However, there would be no 
guarantees of privacy protection for netizens in non-
BIGO countries. 
6 Internet Peace Principles 
In the previous section, we noted that Bright Internet 
principles alone cannot prevent malicious SLCAs 
from non-BIGO countries. Thus, it is necessary to 
derive a complementary measure in the form of the 
Internet Peace Principles, which we define here as 
follows: The (Bright) Internet is built to enhance 
peaceful communication and understanding between 
all global inhabitants and thus should neither be used 
as a weapon for attacking other countries nor as a 
means of detoured malicious attacks. To derive the 
Internet Peace Principles, we adopted three types of 
reasoning: the extension of the physical convention to 
cyberspace, the expansion of international cyber 
security conventions to global member countries, and 
analogical international norms. By integrating the 
derived principles with the specific principles of the 
Bright Internet, we derived the Internet Peace 
Principles, as depicted in Figure 3. We removed 
redundant statements and resolved conflicts between 
statements by prioritizing their importance. 
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Figure 3. Methodologies for Deriving the Internet Peace Principles  
6.1 Extension to the Cyberspace 
Approach 
We derive the spirit of the Internet Peace Principles 
from the existing international conventions 
established for physical space, which should be 
extended to cyberspace. The most relevant cases 
include the UN Charter, the Responsibility of States, 
the Geneva Convention, and the Hague Convention. 
Based on these established agreements, we can derive 
the specific concept of the Internet Peace Principles 
for the safety of cyberspace. The extended statements 
are italicized below.  
• The UN Charter can be extended to cyberspace, 
as follows: Maintain international peace and 
security in cyberspace; take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of 
cybersecurity threats and for the suppression of 
cyberattacks; prohibit the use of SLCAs except 
for legitimate self-defense and countermeasure 
purposes; the UN Security Council may take . . . 
demonstrations, blockade and other operations 
by air, sea, land and cyber forces of members of 
the United Nations. 
• The Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts can be extended 
to cyberspace as follows: The offending state 
should be held responsible for its cyberattacks, 
and the attacked state is entitled to request 
compensation and take legitimate 
countermeasures.  
• The Geneva Convention IV can be extended to 
cyberspace as follows: Prohibit preemptive 
cyberattacks against innocent civilians and their 
facilities in cyberspace. 
• The Hague Convention IV can be extended to 
cyberspace as follows: Regulate the unlimited 
use of means and methods of cyberwarfare. 
6.2 Expansion of International Cyber 
Security Conventions to Global 
Members 
The UN GGE and the Tallinn Manual specify the 
cybersecurity aspects of each participating country, 
while the CECC does so for each participating 
organization and individual. However, the UN GGE 
is still in the recommendation stage, and the Tallinn 
Manual is a nonbinding document. The CECC has 
only 55 member countries as of June 27, 2017. 8 
Therefore, it will be necessary to build a 
comprehensive global convention for cybersecurity 
which can also be merged with the specific principles 
of the Bright Internet, as italicized below. 
 The UN GGE recommendations can be adopted 
for the Internet Peace Principles as: States should 
not knowingly allow their territories to be used 
for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs 
including the breaching of the principles of 
                                                          
8  Retrieved June 27, 2017, from 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-
list/conventions/treaty/185/signatures?p_auth=Z9kSyEKq 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
166 
 
origin responsibility, deliverer responsibility, 
and privacy protection. States should not 
cyberattack the critical infrastructure of other 
states. States should cooperate to exchange 
information to assist each other and to prosecute 
terrorist and criminal use of the Internet 
including the identification of real names upon 
the presentation of a valid search warrant. 
 The Tallinn Manual provides rules about state 
actors’ responsibilities as well as their 
jurisdictions and countermeasures during 
cyberconflicts. Rules 6-7 (due diligence) specify 
the state’s control responsibility of cyber- 
infrastructure that correspond with the chain of 
origin responsibility. Rule 14 states that a state 
shall bear an international legal responsibility for 
a cyberoperation attributable to it. This 
corresponds to the extension of the responsibility 
of a state to cyberspace. The manual mentions 
“jus ad bellum,” the right to go to war, by 
specifying the conditions of a cyberoperation that 
justifies a response in the form of self-defense 
(rule 71) and countermeasures (rule 20), which 
corresponds to the UN Charter. Rules 94 and 99 
invoke “jus in bello,” a humanitarian law that 
regulates conduct during armed conflicts by 
specifying that launching cyberattacks against 
civilians or civilian objects is unlawful, and that 
corresponds to the extension of the Geneva 
Convention to cyberspace. As presented above, 
these rules in the manual overlap with those of 
the UN GGE and/or the cyberextension of 
existing conventions. 
Rule 109 is a unique statement which extends the 
prohibition to nuclear power plants. However, 
the rules about collective cybersanctions and 
cyberblockades are contradictory with regard to 
the cyberextension of the UN Charter. In rule 144, 
collective cybersanctions are prohibited, although 
they are essential for the implementation of 
deliverer responsibility. In rule 128, there is 
debate about rules governing cyberblockades as 
to whether they should be characterized as lex 
lata (referring to current law) or lex ferenda 
(referring to future law) considering the level of 
technical feasibility. Because cyberblockades of 
cyberterror countries or zones are essential for 
the execution of preventive security by deliverer 
responsibility, we regard a cyberblockade as lex 
lata in the Internet Peace Principles. 
• The CECC mainly describes PLCAs and does 
not provide measures against SLCAs. However, 
we introduce the CECC here because BIGO will 
need to consider not only SLCA aspects but also 
those associated with PLCAs. 
6.3 Analogical International Norms 
Approach 
The analogical international norms are referred to as a 
means of deriving the concept of the Internet Peace 
Principles from similar international norms for similar 
problems. For this purpose, we refer to two analogous 
treaties: the Outer Space Treaty and the Non-
Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 
• Since outer space is regarded as the fourth 
domain, the Internet is regarded as the fifth 
domain after land, sea, and air. Hence, the 
Internet Peace Principles should be adopted in 
similarity with the Outer Space Treaty. The 
Internet space should be used for humankind and 
not as a type of weapon. 
• From the NPT’s vision of “Atoms for Peace,” 
we can derive the notion of the “Internet for 
Peace.” For research on and the verification of 
the Bright Internet and Internet Peace Principles, 
there needs to be a forum for agreement like the 
Bright Internet Global Summit (BIG Summit). 
For the implementation of the principles, we 
need an international body like BIGO, just as the 
IAEA is necessary for the implementation of the 
NPT. 
6.4 Ten Internet Peace Principles 
Based on the above analysis, we derive the following 
ten statements of the Internet Peace Principles: 
• Maintenance of Peace: All states should 
maintain international peace and security in 
cyberspace.  
• Prevention of Misuse: States should not 
knowingly allow their territories to be used for 
internationally wrongful acts using ICTs, 
including breaching the principles of origin 
responsibility, deliverer responsibility, and 
privacy protection.  
• Protection of Critical Infrastructure and 
Civilians: States should prohibit preemptive 
cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, 
including nuclear power plants and innocent 
civilians and their facilities in cyberspace. 
• Conditions of Legitimate Cyberattacks: States 
should prohibit the use of SLCAs except for in 
legitimate self-defense and for countermeasure 
purposes. 
• Regulation of Means and Methods: States 
should regulate the unlimited use of the methods 
and means of cyberwarfare.  
• International Cooperative Search: States 
should cooperate to exchange information, 
including the identification of real names upon 
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the issuance of a valid search warrant, in order to 
assist each other and to prosecute terrorists and 
the criminal use of the Internet. 
• Accountability: The offending state should be 
held responsible for the consequences of its 
cyberattacks. 
• Entitlement for Compensation and Self-
Defense: An attacked state is entitled to request 
compensation and to undertake legitimate self-
defense and countermeasures. 
• Enforcement Mechanism: The UN may take 
effective collective measures for the prevention 
and removal of cybersecurity threats and for the 
suppression of cyberattacks and may consider 
cyberblockades.  
• Global Governance: To ensure cooperation 
with the enforcement mechanisms, a forum like 
the BIG Summit and a governance body like the 
BIGO are necessary in order to conduct research 
and realize the implementation and verification 
of the Bright Internet and Internet Peace 
Principles. 
However, not all countries may wish to become 
members of a BIGO-like organization. This is why a 
sanction mechanism against noncompliant cyberterror 
countries will be necessary.  
7 Concluding Remarks and 
Summary  
Cyberterrorism and cybercrimes on the Internet have 
become more sophisticated and intelligent, causing 
major social and economic damage, and threatening 
the foundation of national security and sustainable 
growth. In particular, as hostile countries conceive of 
acts of cyberterrorism more systematically, critical 
national infrastructure becomes more vulnerable to 
catastrophic disasters. However, the current 
individualized defensive security systems cannot 
identify malicious originators and prevent them from 
such state-led cyberattacks. Moreover, in the defense 
of cyberspace, there is no clear distinction between 
military and civilian frontiers. Nevertheless, there are 
currently no effective global governance mechanisms 
that can mitigate the threat of state-led cyberattacks. 
As the foundation of a preventive security solution 
against the risk of state-led cyberattacks, the 
originators of cyberterrorism, or at least the 
originating country, should be identifiable. To 
achieve this goal, the Bright Internet initiative has 
proposed five principles: origin responsibility, 
deliverer responsibility, identifiable anonymity, 
global collaboration, and privacy protection. By 
implementing these principles, the Bright Internet 
intends to achieve the balanced goals of preventing 
cybersecurity and guaranteeing the freedom of 
expression and the privacy of innocent netizens. 
Achieving these goals simultaneously requires a 
holistic design of protocols, technologies, national 
legislation, and global collaboration and 
implementation with support from internationally 
agreeable organizations. For this purpose, we design 
and propose the Bright Internet Global Organization 
in this research. 
According to our vision, as long as BIGO member 
countries conform to the principles of the Bright 
Internet, transparency of the malicious origins of 
cyberattacks can be maintained, and thus the 
motivation of state-led cyberattacks will be deterred. 
However, cyberterror countries will likely not 
voluntarily accept BIGO membership. Therefore, it 
will be necessary to enforce the participation of all 
Internet-connected countries through a new 
international law, like the Internet Peace Principles 
that we propose in this paper. The Internet Peace 
Principles prohibit the use of the Internet as a weapon 
for attacking other countries or as a means of 
detoured malicious attacks. To derive the Internet 
Peace Principles, we adopted three approaches: the 
extension of the physical convention to cyberspace, 
the expansion of international cyber security 
conventions to global member countries, and 
analogical international norms.  
For the extension of the traditional convention to 
cyberspace, we adopted the United Nations Charter, 
the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, the Geneva Convention, and the 
Hague Convention. For the expansion of international 
cybersecurity conventions to global member countries, 
we adopted the UN Group of Governmental Experts, 
the Tallinn Manual created through an invitation by 
the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of 
Excellence, and the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime. Finally, for the derivation of similar 
principles from analogous international norms, we 
adopted the Outer Space Treaty, and the NPT. By 
integrating the concepts from these sources in a 
consistent manner, we derive the statements 
pertaining to the Internet Peace Principles, as 
described in Section 6. 
Owing to the deterrence power of the Bright Internet 
and the Internet Peace Principles, we believe that the 
paradigm of preventive cybersecurity can be 
established and that the motivations behind 
cyberattacks can be drastically ameliorated. Therefore, 
all countries should come together to establish this 
type of framework and a Bright Internet global 
governance organization. To facilitate talks toward 
this end, the BIG Summit was held for the first time 
in Seoul in December of 2017 as a pre-ICIS 
conference of the Association for Information 
Systems. In 2018, two meetings will be held at 
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Tsinghua University and Stanford University 
respectively. By establishing the Bright Internet 
Global Organization with an appropriate sanction 
mechanism, national security and human society 
would be able to prevent the catastrophic threat of 
state-led cyberattacks.  
The research on preventing state-led cyberattacks 
through the Bright Internet and the Internet Peace 
Principles is in its infancy, but we believe it has the 
potential to have a major effect and represents a 
significant research opportunity in the effort to make 
the next generation of the Internet safer and more 
peaceful. We can foresee a major research 
opportunity in the area of security policies for 
preventive information systems domestically and 
internationally. This opens new research opportunities 
in areas of design science and behavioral science. A 
wider discussion on this topic can also be found in the 
paper, “Design and Validation of the Bright Internet,” 
found in part 1 of this special issue on the Bright ICT 
(Lee et al., 2018).  
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Appendix 
     
Table 1. Cases of State-Led Cyberattacks 
Cases (S1) Sony hacking 
(S2) Iran 
Stuxnet 
attack 
(S3) Georgia 
DDoS attack 
(S4) Estonia 
DDoS attack 
(S5) KHNP 
hacking 
(S6) 3/20 APT 
attack 
(S7) 7/7 DDoS 
attack 
(1) Purposes of 
cyberattacks 
Cancellation of 
showing of “The 
Interview” 
movie. (a)  
Progress delay 
of Iran nuclear 
development. 
(a)  
Maintaining the 
lead before and 
during war.  
Expression of 
dissatisfaction 
with the 
movement of a 
monument. 
Causing social 
chaos and 
anxiety. 
Causing social 
chaos and 
damage. 
Gaining 
intelligence 
regarding the 
targets to carry 
out further 
attacks. (a) 
Political attack. (a)  
Causing 
disruption, rather 
than stealing data. 
(b)  
Gathering Korea 
and U.S. military 
information. (c) 
(2) Targets of 
cyberattacks 
Sony Pictures 
Entertainment 
(Sony) 
Iran Natanz 
Nuclear facility 
(German 
SCADA 
system) 
Homepage of 
Georgian 
President, 
parliament, 
national defense, 
foreign ministry, 
banks, press, 
portal, Western 
press and 
websites of 
Georgian 
hackers. (a)  
Information 
distribution 
channels, national 
Internet 
infrastructure, 
governmental and 
political websites, 
commercial & 
private services, 
emergency 
numbers, 112, etc. 
KHNP 
computer 
system and data 
At least 20 
organizations 
including three 
major banks and 
three 
broadcasters. 
14 U.S. 
government 
institutions and 22 
Korean 
government 
institutions, etc. 
(d) 
(3) Origin 
country 
Shenyang, 
China (North 
Korean hackers 
known as 
“Guardians of 
Peace”). (b) 
Prepared by 
Israel and U.S. 
(a)  
Russia (Russian 
Business 
Network)  
Russia (Russian 
government IPs) 
North Korea 
(North Korean 
IP) 
Beijing, China 
(IP of North  
Korea Posts 
and Telecom 
Co. [KPTC]) 
Shenyang, 
China (Chinese 
IP)  
Russia (Russian 
IP) 
North Korea 
(North Korean 
IP)  
China (North 
Korean KPTC’ s 
IP). (e)  
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Table 1. Cases of State-Led Cyberattacks 
(4) Attack 
means and 
methods 
 
Malware 
“Destover.” (c)  
Sony intranet 
was infected 
with malware 
via an e-mail 
attack and 
compromised 
system was used 
to propagate 
malicious code. 
(d) 
File deletion, 
master boot 
record 
destruction 
through shared 
networks 
sequentially. (d) 
Hacking 
message 
displayed on PC 
screens of Sony 
(e). 
Malware 
“Stuxnet.”  
Nuclear facility 
innersystem 
compromised 
through a 
universal serial 
bus (USB) flash 
drive.   
DDoS. 
Traffic blockade 
through attacks 
on routers in 
Georgia. 
Major banks’ 
systems 
paralyzed. 
 
Defacement of 
websites. 
Domain name 
system (DNS) 
servers attacked. 
DDoS. 
 Critical 
infrastructure 
paralyzed for two 
weeks by DDoS 
attack. 
Six instances of 
blackmail. 
Master boot 
record 
destruction. 
Kimsuky 
affiliation 
malware. 
Known to be 
used by North 
Korean hackers. 
E-mail attacks 
(5,986 phishing 
e-mails to 3,571 
employees). 
APT attacks. 
Attacked four 
times. 
Programmed 
attack time-
loaded 
SQL injection, 
web shell upload 
Careful 
preparation: 
76 types of 
malicious codes, 
structures and 
operations were 
different for each 
company 
attacked. (b) 
Malware, web 
hard sites exploit. 
Attacked four 
times. 
Cooperation 
between malicious 
codes.  
Attacks on 
multiple  
domains. 
Damage to 
important files and 
documents. 
Hard disk 
damaged by 
software. 
After attack, 
zombie PCs 
conducted self-
destruction. 
Attack 
characteristics 
Spear phishing 
attack exploiting 
zero-day 
vulnerability. (f) 
Typical man-in-
the -middle 
attack. 
Structured query 
language (SQL) 
injection. 
Zombie 
computers used.  
Russian hackers 
attacked Internet 
connection 
passage to 
paralyze the 
Georgian 
Internet. 
SQL Injection 
with DDoS 
attack. 
About 1 
million 
computers were 
mobilized.  
 
Social 
engineering 
through a 
watering hole 
using a social 
media website 
such as Twitter. 
Spread of 
malicious codes 
using a vaccine 
update program.  
About 48,000 
PCs were 
mobilized. 
Hacking and 
compromising 
web service 
to distribute 
malware that 
programmed 
attack time. 
115,044 PCs were 
mobilized. 
(5) Attack 
routes 
 
Direct 
connection to 
target. (b) 
Infected USB - 
C&C server. 
Through servers 
located in Russia 
and Turkey. 
Approximately 
100 countries. (a)  
Direct 
connection and 
routed through 
at least five 
countries. 
49 routers 
(domestic 25, 
overseas 24). 
Using VPN. 
Communication 
with 435 servers 
of at least 61 
nations. 
(6) Attack 
timing 
 
Before showing 
the film. 
Appropriate 
time for using an 
infected USB 
memory stick. 
Before and 
during the war. 
Appropriate time 
for instigating 
pro-Russian 
emotion. 
 Appropriate 
time for 
attacking. 
Appropriate time 
for attacking 
Independence 
Day to draw 
attention. 
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Table 1. Cases of State-Led Cyberattacks 
(7) Attack 
duration 
Early Sept.(b) 
–Nov. 24, 2014 
(g)  
Jan. 2010– 
Sept. 2010 (b)  
July 19–Aug. 28, 
2008 
Apr. 27– 
May 19, 2007 
Dec. 9, 2014–  
Mar. 12, 2015 
Mar. 20–26, 2013  1st Attack: 
July.4 (EST), 
2nd Attack: 
July 7 (KT), 
3rd Attack: 
July 8 (KT) 
4th Attack: 
July 9 (KT). 
(8) Preparation 
period 
About three 
months (b) 
Bush admin. – 
Dec. 2009  
Unidentified Unidentified At least six 
months 
At least nine 
months 
Five months (f)  
(9) Investigation 
period 
26 days Unidentified Unidentified Unidentified 159 days 21 days 21 days 
(10) 
Consequences 
Sony’s 
reputation 
damaged by 
breach 
US$100 million. 
(h) 
Caused nearly 
two-year delay 
in nuclear 
development. 
(a) 
Georgia 
surrendered after 
five days of war 
with Russia. 
Tens of millions 
US$. (b) 
Administration 
tasks paralyzed 
for two months. 
Social unrest. 
Fall of image 
for nuclear 
exporting 
countries. 
Social unrest 
US$867.2 
million. (c) 
Cybersecurity 
systems’ 
vulnerability 
exposed. 
US$36.3– 54.4 
million. (g) 
Damage in 
detail 
47,000 cases of 
personal 
information 
leaked. (g) 
33,000 cases of 
internal 
company 
documents 
leaked. (g) 
Five unopened 
movies leaked. 
(g) 
Stuxnet may 
have destroyed 
about 1,000 
centrifuges. 
Lost control of 
national domain 
names. 
Banking 
operations 
paralyzed. 
58 sites’ services 
interrupted for 
two months. 
Eight PCs 
infected, 
94 files leaked, 
including the 
nuclear power 
plant’s 
blueprints and 
personal 
information. 
48,700 PCs were 
infected, 
32,552 servers 
and PCs 
damaged, and 
data destroyed.  
16,221 units of 
CD/ ATMs 
damaged and data 
destroyed. (c) 
1,300 units of PCs 
damaged, 
11 million units of 
PCs infected. 
(11) Applicable 
laws 
Related domestic laws such as criminal law and the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.  
When the results of the attack necessitate a use of force, the attack should face the UN Security Council and the international court. 
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Table 1. Cases of State-Led Cyberattacks 
(12) References *The FBI, 
2014 
(a) Nichols, 
2014; Gallager, 
2014 
(b) Sanger & 
Fackler, 2015 
(c) Symantec, 
2014 
(d) Gil, 2014 
(e) Daily Mail, 
2014 
(f) Hesseldahl, 
2015 
(g) Musil, 
2014 
(h) Milliken & 
Oatis, 2014 
* Zetter, 2011 
 (a) Sanger, 
2012 
(b) AhnLab, 
2010 
* Tikk et al., 
2010 
(a) Kozlowski, 
2014 
* Tikk et al., 
2010 
(a) Park, 2013 
(b) Kim, 2013 
* Supreme 
Prosecutors’ 
Office, 2015 
* Ministry of 
Science, ICT & 
Future 
Planning, 2013 
(a) Sherstobitoff 
& Itai Liba, 2013 
(b) Ahnlab, 2013 
(c) Shin et al., 
2013 
* Korean 
National Police 
agency, 2009 
(a) Nazario, 2009 
(b) Choe &John, 
2009 
(c)Sherstobitoff & 
Itai Liba, 2013 
(d) Chae, 2010 
(e) Oh, 2011 
(f) Kim, 2015 
(g) Emerging  
Technology 
Research Center, 
2009 
 
Table 2. Cases of Private-Led Cyberattacks 
Cases (P1) Hollywood hospital hacking 
(P2) SK Communications 
hacking (P3) Coca-Cola hacking 
(1) Purposes of cyberattacks Asking for money: 40 Bitcoins 
(US$17,000). 
Leakage of customer records.  Leakage of negotiation information.  
(2) Targets of cyberattacks Hollywood Presbyterian Medical 
Center 
SK Communications  Coca-Cola Corporation executives’ 
computers  
(3) Origin country Unidentified China (Chinese hackers)  China (Chinese hackers) (a) 
(4) Attack means and methods Hackers used malware to infect a 
hospital’s computers and to prevent 
hospital staff from communicating 
with those devices. 
Using ransomware called “Locky” 
to lock systems by encrypting files. 
(a) 
An employee mistakenly clicked on 
an e-mail attachment that was 
actually a phishing scam. (b) 
Turning the company’s internal 
network PCs into zombies, 
obtaining the manager’s 
authorization, connecting to the 
database server, and leaking data 
with a Chinese IP through remote 
control . 
After hacking “Alzip” update server 
of Estsoft, the hackers spread 
malicious codes . 
Phishing e-mails to executives of 
the Coca-Cola Company. 
Attackers installed a keystroke 
logger to steal e-mails, documents 
and computer account passwords 
for easy access to the company’s 
network. (b)  
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Table 2. Cases of Private-Led Cyberattacks 
Attack characteristics Encryption of patient information 
for money, and the hackers keep the 
ransom by providing a decryption 
key. (c) 
Hacking for a targeted attack (a 
precise spread of malicious code 
aimed at a specific site). (a)  
62 Inner infected PCs were 
mobilized. 
Coca-Cola did not know until the 
FBI informed them that they were 
hacked. 
Coca-Cola kept the breach a secret 
due to concerns over stock prices 
and credibility. (b)  
(5) Attack routes Unidentified Indirect attack through the US Unidentified 
(6) Attack timing Selecting and attacking targets after 
finding a loophole in security.  
Usual time for gathering 
information. 
Before and during negotiations. 
(7) Attack duration Feb. 5– 15, 2016  July 26, 2011 Feb.16–  Mar. 16, 2009  
(8) Preparation period Unidentified At least eight days  
(July 18– July 25) 
Unidentified 
(9) Investigation period Unidentified 15 days Unidentified 
(10) Consequences Discrediting of hospital name.  Fall of corporate image. Fall of corporate image. 
Damage in detail US$17,000  Leakage of 35 million cases of 
customer information . 
Leakage of inside information and 
reputation damaged . 
Acquisition plan of the China 
Huiyuan Juice Group fell through. 
(11) Applicable laws Domestic related laws such as criminal law and international law through the Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty. 
(12) References * Stefanek, 2016 
(a) Zetter, 2016 
(b) Infosec institute, 2016  
(c) Lee, 2016 
*Korean National Police 
Agency, 2011 
(a) Lee, 2011 
* Charette, 2012 
(a) BBC News, 2012 
(b) Network World, 2012 
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Table 3. Origins, Paths, and Targets of SLCAs and PLCAs 
Cases Origins Paths Targets References 
(S1) Sony Hacking 
(2014) 
 
Chinese IPs (exclusively 
used by North Korean) 
(a)  
 Chinese ISP  U.S. ISP 
  
 Sony *The FBI, 2014 
 (a) Sanger & 
Fackler, 2015   
(S2) Iran Stuxnet 
Attack (2011)  
An infected USB flash 
drive (Man-in-the Middle 
Attack)  
 The malicious worm 
infiltrated into the inner 
network  
 Natanz’s nuclear facility 
equipment was infected by a 
virus, which was controlled 
by C&C servers in Denmark 
and Malaysia  
Compromised process-
control network of intra-
network through OS server 
 Control system network  
*Hruska, 2015 
*Zetter, 2011 
*Csanyi, 2011 
(S3) Georgia 
DDoS attack 
(2008) 
Russian IP   Russian ISP  Turkish, 
Ukrainian ISP  Georgian 
ISP   
 Governmental 
organizations’ home pages  
*Tikk et al., 2010 
 
(S4) Estonia DDoS 
attack (2007) 
Russian IP   Russian ISP  One 
million zombie PCs were 
mobilized from 
approximately 100 
countries. (a)  Estonian 
ISP  
 Critical infrastructure  *Tikk et al., 2010 
(a) Park, 2013 
 
(S5) KHNP 
hacking (2014–
2015) 
25 North Korean IPs   North Korean ISP 
(SJV)(a)  Chinese ISP  
South Korean VPN (illegal 
use of another´s name) 
 Nuclear power plant (log 
record was confirmed) 
* Korea Supreme 
Prosecutors’ Office, 
2015 
Five IPs of North Korean 
Post and Telco (KPTC) 
located in Beijing China 
 
 Chinese ISP  South 
Korean VPN (a North 
Korean IP was found on a 
South Korean VPN)  
South Korean ISP  
 Nuclear power plant (log 
record was confirmed) 
IP(s) from Shenyang, 
China (175.167.xxx.xxx) 
 
 Chinese ISP  ISPs in 
the USA, China, Japan, 
Thailand, and The 
Netherlands  South 
Korean VPN  South 
Korean ISP  
 Collected information 
from a retiree community  
Sent phishing e-mails to 
retired employees  
Collected and leaked 
information from the 
affiliated companies  
Threatened five times by 
blackmail to extort money 
and to reveal the leaked 
information to the public 
through Naver, Twitter, and 
other routes. 
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Table 3. Origins, Paths, and Targets of SLCAs and PLCAs 
Russian IP (Vladivostok) 
 
 Russian ISP  South 
Korean ISP  
 Leaked the blueprints of 
the nuclear power plant and 
exposed through a Twitter 
account that was used by a 
North Korean hacker, and 
attempted extortion.  
(S6) 3/20 APT 
attack (2013) 
North Korean IP   North Korean ISP  
Chinese ISP (VPN)  
South Korean ISP  PMS 
Server  Zombie PCs  
Overseas ISPs  C&C 
Servers in four detour states 
in the first attack and seven 
detour states in the second 
attack  Detour state’s 
ISPs South Korean ISP  
 Financial institutions, 
automated teller machines, press, 
and servers in South Korea  
* Ministry of 
Science, ICT & 
Future Planning, 
2013 
(S7) 7/7 DDoS 
attack (2009) 
North Korean KPTC’s IP 
in China  
 Chinese ISP  
 South Korean ISP  
South Korean file sharing 
sites  Contamination of 
malware and production of 
zombie PCs in 61 countries 
and 435 servers  Detour 
states’ ISPs  
 14 organizations in the US 
 22 organizations in Korea 
including governmental 
agencies, the press, and 
civilian enterprises 
* Clarke & Knake, 
2010 
* Korean National 
Police agency, 2009 
  
(P2) SK 
communications 
Chinese IP  Chinese ISP  U.S. ISP 
 U.S. Domain  U.S. 
ISP Korean ISP  
hacking Antivirus update 
server in Korea  
Infection of 62 PCs of SK 
Communications (becoming 
Zombie PCs) 
* Korean National 
Police Agency, 2011 
 
* The attack routes of the (P1) Hollywood Hospital and (P3) Coca-Cola cases were not identified. 
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